Oxfam programme researcher John Magrath (he’s the one on the left in the pic) has been looking at some European aid, and is impressed
with what he found
European Aid gets a lousy press. If you’re a reader of the UK’s Daily Mail (and nearly 2 million Brits are) then you’ll be used to headlines such as “Dance lessons in Africa, jets for tyrants, derelict offices….how EU wastes aid billions“.
(I must pause this blog to say that merely checking the reality of the above headline on the Daily Mail’s website – where it is accompanied by a photo of a masked figure of what Westerners used to call an African “witch doctor” – has made me want to devote the rest of this post to a rant about the Daily Mail’s politics and attitudes….but…deep breath and back to EU aid…)
EU aid is currently under greater threat than ever in Europe’s acrimonious budget discussions – partly, it’s a useful way for Euro sceptics to attack the whole concept of the European Union and the list of anti-Europe stories (remember bent (or was it straight?) bananas etc).
Does EU aid deserve its reputation? DFID doesn’t think so, giving it good marks in its multilateral aid review. So it’s rather nice to be able to point to an EU-funded aid programme that really has done a lot of good – and indeed, is ahead of the game when it comes to thinking about what sort of aid works best. It didn’t make the headlines, but then, good news rarely does.
The European Union Food Facility (EUFF) was a €1bn fund for access to agricultural inputs and services, and improvements in agricultural productive capacity, set up in response to the increase in food prices from late 2007 through 2008.
In all, the EUFF funded over 240 projects in more than 50 countries. On 17 December, the EU published its own Final Evaluation of all the programmes. Oxfam took part in a big way in six EUFF programmes in Nepal, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tanzania and Mali, as well as being part of consortia in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Kenya. Coincidentally, I’ve been looking through the end of programme evaluations we submitted and today we’ve published our own case study.
And what did we find? That the bold claims made for the EUFF in a press release on 2 December 2011 by WFP, FAO and IFAD seem correct. Their release said: “The EU Food Facility has been a tremendous success. It proves that linking relief, rehabilitation and development can have a concrete impact on people’s food security”. They added it “provided tangible evidence that investing in agriculture and nutrition improves global food security” and “by linking farmers to markets and financial services, assisting in facilitating sustainable and profitable farming practices and creating new revenue streams, the effects of the EUFF will continue into their futures”.
[caption id="attachment_13059" align="alignleft" width="300" caption="Indian seed fair"]
[/caption]
According to the release, “lessons learned from the initiative underscore the importance of:
-focusing on marginalized farmers with high production potential,
-combining input distribution with extension services,
-building capacities of smallholder farmers and their communities,
-rehabilitating rural infrastructures, and
-involving all actors of the value chain in local seed production.”
In Oxfam’s experience this approach really broke down the silos between humanitarian and long term development aid. In every country farmers faced the same or very similar obstacles. They needed certain basic inputs, in particular seeds and irrigation water; they required both access to markets and ‘power in markets’; they needed cash and/or credit; and they wanted services such as agricultural advice and veterinary help. So the vision and capacity to make multiple interventions – and at many levels – were crucial.
For the EU this approach has been rather a long time coming – about three years in fact – but it’s nearly there. The EU’s 2010 Food Security policy aims to get all member states working this way, then this October the EU focused on “building resilience” and integrating humanitarian and development work . And now, finally, the long-awaited implementation plan for the food security policy should be endorsed by Development Ministers next May (2013) – and not a day too soon.
I summarised our interventions in this way, on a spectrum from emergency response to long term development:
Social protection
- Collective cash-for-work for infrastructure (e.g. roads, dams, irrigation works, tree planting, re-greening, etc)
- Unconditional cash transfers to meet food needs during the hungry season
- Food vouchers and support to traders
- Small livestock and veterinary services
- Beneficiary involvement, agency accountability
- Seeds, tools, feed, micro-irrigation, seed banks, grain stores
- Training on improved agricultural practices (e.g. composting)
- Land rights
- Access to credit
- Stoves
- Formal creation of producer groups; also irrigation management groups, grain store groups, pasture management groups, etc
- Capacity building for new and existing groups
- Emphasis on women’s groups and women’s involvement
- Farmer to farmer
- Scaling up and broadening out organizations
- Business training
- Value chain analysis, market information
- Linkages with the private sector e.g. assistance in negotiations
- Access to credit, bank loans, micro insurance
- Linkages with state authorities and service providers at local, regional and national levels
- Linkages with the private sector
- Advocacy on budgets, policy changes, frameworks, etc, from local to national level
- collaborate with a wide variety of stakeholders, including the private sector;
- design projects that are community-managed;
- organize farmers into groups; and
- provide a cash transfer so people can withstand shocks, keep assets and develop infrastructure.
In one way, it sounds simple – putting into practice the three-fold support identified by Wiggins and Leturque as essential to liberate the potential of small farmers:
- Stability in the face of price volatility and incentives to earn more money from farming;
- Investment in public goods;
- Strategies to overcome the problem of chronic failure in rural financial markets.