Heather Marquette (occasional contributor to this blog) has started a new newsletter drawing on her work for SOC ACE – the Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence programme (and sister programme to SOAS ACE and Global Integrity ACE) and lots more on corruption, organised crime, conflict, security, foreign policy and development..
The first two editions dropped this week, and here are some highlights (minus the discussion a recent FP2P post â too much self-citation bad for the health). You can subscribe here.
The post combines some in depth discussion of things sheâs read, and a broader set of short links.

The real crisis of global order (Alexander Cooley & Daniel H Nexon, Foreign Affairs)
Alexander Cooley and Daniel H Nexonâs piece on âThe real crisis of global orderâ for Foreign Affairs has far too much in it thatâs worth reading to even begin to give it justice and is a genuine must read, particularly for anyone working on foreign policy, national security and strategy. Through use of a wide range of examples, they argue:
In their current form, liberal institutions cannot stem the rising illiberal tide; governments have struggled to prevent the diffusion of antidemocratic ideologies and tactics, both homegrown and imported. Liberal democracies must adapt to fend off threats on multiple levels. But there is a catch. Any attempt to grapple with this crisis will require policy decisions that are clearly illiberal or necessitate a new version of liberal order.
Thereâs so much in the piece, and I canât just cut and paste it all here (though I would love toâŠ). They discuss the emergence of what they describe as âasymmetric opennessâ, where technological innovations that created more open flows of knowledge and commerce, along with illiberal policy choices by liberal democracies and a number of evolving, adaptive authoritarian practices means we have âthe strange reality that the contemporary liberal order works better for authoritarian regimes than it does for liberal democraciesâ. Liberal democracies face many threats from within, including âhomegrown antidemocratic’ forcesâ, and a backlash against the ideas underpinning political liberalism, including the belief in certain universal rights and values. Whether in the examples they include – the US, the UK, Hungary and Uganda – or beyond, illiberal forces connect together across borders in whatâs often referred to as the so-called âculture warsâ to push back against the ideas underpinning universal human rights.
This has an impact on the area I personally work in as well. As Cooley and Nexon argue,
The Biden administration has correctly declared corruption to be a national security risk. But anticorruption measures will inspire blowback that also poses a national security concern. Aggressive measures will threaten politically connected oligarchs in Europe and elsewhere. Corrupt autocrats are likely to see a number of anti-kleptocracy efforts, such as expanding diligence requirements for service providers and prohibiting foreign officials from accepting bribes, as a serious threat to their regimes and will rally their publics against these new forms of âdomestic interference.â Important steps for conserving liberalism, even defensive ones, will generate pushback against the liberal orderâand not just from overseas. Anticorruption measures threaten a wide range of U.S. politicians, businesspeople, and consultants. In recent years, and especially after the 2016 election, such measures have become another source of partisan polarization.
In analysis published with Westminster Foundation for Democracy last year on âDoing anticorruption democraticallyâ, I also discuss this danger:
âŠthere is emerging evidence that suggests the fight against corruption itself can harm democracy. This includes things like anticorruption messaging campaigns that leave people more likely to pay a bribe and less likely to feel theyâre able to do anything themselves to fight back. Or how the reporting of corruption by investigative journalists and civil society can fuel populism and backlashes against democracy. Or where the politicisation of corruption in election campaigns can weaken democracy and may even lead to rising authoritarianism or violence. All of these are serious charges that need to be taken seriously; however itâs also important to remember that the real problem is not the anti-corruption interventions but rather the corruption and the impunity of the powerful, perceived or otherwise. The solution needs to be tackling impunity, but this definitely doesnât mean we should continue doing the same anticorruption things in the same ways as we do now.
Shorts

A bonanza for people interested in smuggling can be found in the new Routledge Handbook of Smuggling, edited by Max Gallien and Florian Weigand, and which is entirely open access. As a side note, Maxâs paper on âResearching the politics of illegal activitiesâ is a serious must read for anyone in the field.
Two new articles on âsocial badsâ and citizen attitudes: one from Amelie Godefroidt on âHow terrorism does (and does not) affect citizensâ political attitudes: a meta-analysisâ, and another by my colleagues Nic Cheeseman and Caryn Peiffer on âThe curse of good intentions: why anticorruption messaging can encourage briberyâ.
OpenDemocracyâs report by Alice McCool and Khatondi Soita Wepukhulu on âUS conservatives spreading anti-vax misinformation to unvaccinated Ugandaâ is disturbing, with serious consequences for health security in Uganda and globally, as well as for the liberal order (see Cooley and Nexon for related examples).
Shannon Zimmerman argues that âPeace and security are not the same thingâ in this piece for the Lowy Institute, arguing against combining peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, the latter of which she says âcloses off political space that successful peace operations needâ.
Ivan Gunjicâs report for U4 on âAlbaniaâs Special Courts against Corruption and Organised Crimeâ includes interesting insights on a different way to embed anti-corruption/counter-organised crime reforms within wider judicial reforms, including why thinking about political and technical feasibility is important from the start.
Liz David-Barrett has been doing some interesting thinking recently about state capture, including here in the UK, and her piece for OpenDemocracy on âIf Tory whips are blackmailing MPs, thatâs corruption. We should call it thatâ assesses current scandals through this wider lens.
For Ukraine watchers, Michael Hikari Cecire, senior policy advisor at the Helsinki Commission, has written about why âHalf measures are worse than nothing in Ukraineâ for Foreign Policy, where he argues that speed and plausibility are key, i.e., âsteps that not only can be taken quickly but that Russia will believe Washington will carry throughâ.
Another Ukraine read is an article from the UKâs Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, which focuses in large part on President Putinâs article âOn the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainiansâ. Beyond being an interesting read in its own right, what I found most striking about Wallaceâs article is how different it is from most outputs from UK ministers: an article, not a speech or press release, that reads as if heâs written it himself, rather than something pulled together with (or by) special advisors and officials. Whether or not thatâs true, I donât know, of course, but it would be nice to have more of this sort of thing. It makes for more interesting reading anywayâŠ
Human Rights Watchâs report on âAfghanistan: Taliban deprive women of livelihoods, identityâ raises a lot of important questions for both the Taliban government and the international community. Well worth a read along this story by Emma Graham-Harrison in the Guardian called ââWe are strugglingâ: two former officials at Afghan womenâs affairs ministryâ.

Mirko Heinzelâs paper on âDivided loyalties? The role of national IO [international organisation] staff in aid-funded procurementâ finds that the context-specific knowledge national staff have increases the development effectiveness of procurement. Food for thought.
People interested in tracking unrest, corruption, inequality, violence and so on will find this piece by Jeremy Cliffe in the New Statesman on âWhy the global middle class is in revoltâ worth reading. Itâs good to read alongside Benjamin Press and Tom Carothers âThe four dynamics that drove protests in 2021â, drawing on Carnegieâs new Global Protest Tracker data, with the four dynamics being: 1) resistance to coups and rising authoritarianism, 2) fierce political contestation, 3) frustration with public health responses and 4) economic insecurity. Apparently, a system that allows the stonking inequality outlined in Oxfamâs recent report on how âInequality Killsâ in the context of COVID-19 is a Very Bad Thing. Who woulda thunkâŠ
Lots more in the newsletter (including poetry, fiction etc) but thatâs a blogâs worth for now. You can subscribe here.